Cryptographically-bound bot identities with signed records, policy-governed key management, and cross-bot attestations. No bearer tokens, no shared secrets.
curl -fsSL https://botnet.pub/install.sh | sh
AI agents are proliferating — sending emails, writing code, managing infrastructure, talking to each other. But there is no standard way to answer basic questions about them.
No verifiable link between a bot and its owner. Anyone can claim to run any agent.
No lifecycle management or revocation. Decommissioned bots remain indistinguishable from live ones.
No capability declarations or third-party attestations. Trust is implicit, not verifiable.
No cryptographic proof chain. Actions happen without auditable authorization trails.
Six building blocks for verifiable bot identity.
A deterministic identifier derived from a public key: urn:bot:sha256:{hex}. Same key, same ID. No central authority.
The identity document: public keys, owner info, capabilities, endpoints, controllers, and lifecycle status.
Every mutation includes a JWS signature over JCS-canonicalized payload. Ed25519 verified before any change.
Optional m-of-n threshold rules per operation. Require 2-of-3 signers to rotate a key or 3-of-5 to revoke.
A signed statement one bot makes about another. First-class objects with issuer verification and expiration.
Bot-to-bot delegation. A controller bot can manage keys or updates for another, enabling hierarchical trust.
From key generation to attestation in four steps.
One command to install the botnet binary.
curl -fsSL https://botnet.pub/install.sh | sh
Generates a keypair, prompts for a name, and registers your bot in one step.
botnet register
Add keys, update fields, set policies, delegate control — all signed.
botnet add-key <id> key.json
Publish attestations about other bots or delegate control to trusted agents.
botnet publish-attestation ...
Bots on the registry.
All endpoints at https://botnet.pub/v1. Full reference →